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A NEARLY PERFECT SYSTEM FOR CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT
Albert W. Alschuler*
I. HOW TO CONVICT THE INNOCENT
A law school casebook asks whether plea bargaining “convict[s]
defendants who are in fact innocent (and would be acquitted [at
trial]).”1 As the question indicates, the fact that plea bargaining
may lead some innocent defendants to plead guilty is not a powerful
criticism of this practice.
The casebook asks whether plea
bargaining increases the number of wrongful convictions. Because
no one can know how many wrongful convictions are produced
either by trials or by guilty pleas, the question may seem
unanswerable.
But in fact the answer is easy. Convicting defendants who would
be acquitted at trial is one of the principal goals of plea bargaining.
“Half a loaf is better than none,” prosecutors say.2 “When we have a
weak case for any reason, we’ll reduce to almost anything rather
than lose.”3 If the correlation between “weak cases” and actual
innocence is better than random, plea bargaining surely “convict[s]
defendants who are in fact innocent (and would be acquitted [at
trial]).”
Prosecutors engage in both “odds bargaining” and “costs
bargaining.” That is, they bargain both to ensure conviction in
doubtful cases and to save the costs of trial. Were a prosecutor to
engage in odds bargaining alone, he might estimate a defendant’s
chance of conviction at trial at 50% and this defendant’s probable
sentence if convicted at trial at ten years. Splitting the difference,
the prosecutor then might offer to recommend a sentence of five

* Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the University of
Chicago. I am grateful to Josh Bowers for insightful and helpful comments.
1 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 12
(9th ed. 2012).
2
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60
(1968).
3 Id. at 59.
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years in exchange for a plea of guilty. Five years is what economists
would call the defendant’s “expected” sentence—his predicted posttrial sentence discounted by the possibility of acquittal.4
An offer of five years, however, would leave a risk-neutral
defendant indifferent between pleading guilty and standing trial,
and the prosecutor hopes to avoid a trial. He does not want the
defendant to be indifferent. The prosecutor therefore engages in
costs bargaining as well as odds bargaining. He tailors his final
offer, not to balance, but to overbalance the defendant’s chances of
acquittal.5 This prosecutor may offer four years in exchange for a
plea—or two or three.6 One can easily discover real-world cases in
which prosecutors fearful of defeat at trial have struck bargains
allowing defendants facing potential life sentences to plead guilty to
misdemeanors.7
When a prosecutor has no chance of obtaining a conviction at
trial, he may be unable to make an offer that will overbalance the
defendant’s chances of acquittal.8 In every other case, however, the
prosecutor can reduce the offered punishment to the point that it
will become advantageous for the defendant to plead guilty whether
he is guilty or innocent. Trials should occur only when defendants
irrationally press their luck or when prosecutors and defendants
disagree about probable trial outcomes and sentences.9 In fact,

4 As I have noted elsewhere, this description of the “expected” sentence is oversimplified,
but the oversimplification does not affect the points I make in text. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1413 n.7 (2003).
5 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 289 (1983) (describing plea bargaining as an element of a “well-functioning market
system”).
6 If defendants were as concerned as prosecutors with avoiding the costs of trial, costs
bargaining would disappear from the equation. As I have explained elsewhere, however, they
are not. See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 693 (2013).
7 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 61; Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role
in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1311 (1975).
8 Even when a prosecutor has no hope of prevailing at trial, he may be able to obtain a
guilty plea by bluffing. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 65 (describing bluffing by both
prosecutors and defense attorneys). Moreover, “process costs” may induce defendants to
plead guilty even when their guilt cannot be proven at trial. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining
System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 949–56 (1983).
9 Reforming the bargaining process by giving defendants more information is unlikely to
reduce the number of wrongful convictions significantly. Except when discovery reveals that
the prosecutor has no chance at trial, it may only get the innocent better deals. See Russell D.
Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 91
(2009) (“[E]nhanced discovery may not increase the disparity between the plea rate of guilty
and innocent persons . . . .”).
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trials are extremely rare in the American criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court noted in 2012 that 97% of federal convictions
and 94% of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.10
Shawn Bushway, Allison Redlich, and Robert Norris recently
provided evidence that real-world plea bargaining fits the economic
model just described. They presented a hypothetical aggravated
robbery case to 1585 prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges,
offering one of sixteen evidentiary variations on the case to each
respondent.11
They asked each respondent to estimate the
likelihood of conviction at trial, the probable sentence following
conviction at trial, and what sentence the respondent would accept
as part of a plea agreement. For all but a few variations, the
average acceptable sentence following a guilty plea was less that the
predicted trial sentence discounted by the likelihood of acquittal.12
Plea bargaining plainly makes it advantageous for innocent
defendants with good prospects of acquittal to plead guilty.
10 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, Table 5.22.2009,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf; SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (Dec. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf (last
updated Nov. 22, 2010)).
11 Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the
Trial”, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723, 732, 733, 734 (2014).
12 Id. at 740 tbl.3. Some comments on this study:
If one were to assume that the early years of a prison sentence have greater disutility
than the later years and/or that conviction itself constitutes a significant part of an offender’s
punishment, the responses might not show that the sentence reduction obtained by pleading
guilty routinely overbalances the likelihood of acquittal. At the same time, if one were to
assume that uncertainty reduction constitutes an important part of a plea agreement’s value,
the responses might understate the extent to which offers overbalance the likelihood of
acquittal. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1080–81 (1976).
In the table cited above, the responses reported by Bushway and his co-authors include
those of judges, and judges were less sensitive than prosecutors and defense attorneys to
changes in the likelihood of conviction. Bushway et al., supra note 11, at 744. The judges in
fact “seem[ed] to be acting in a manner consistent with the fixed discount model.” Id. at 746.
If the responses of judges were excluded from the table, the extent to which offers appeared to
overbalance the likelihood of acquittal undoubtedly would be even greater.
The difference between judges and the other respondents is unsurprising. Judges are
likely to care as much or more about “moving” cases as prosecutors, but they are likely to care
less about maximizing the number of convictions. See Alschuler, supra, at 1131; Bushway et
al., supra note 11, at 748.
Although the study by Bushway and his co-authors indicates that a sentence following a
guilty plea is likely to be less severe that the predicted post-trial sentence discounted by the
likelihood of acquittal, a study by David Abrams based on Cook County data reached the
opposite conclusion. See David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 200, 220 (2011). But the Abrams study is the product of careless work. Its
author apparently inflated the likelihood of acquittal by counting as acquittals four or five
times as many dispositions as he should have. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 689–91.
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A legal system in which a prosecutor could convict whomever he
liked just by pointing could lead to conviction in cases in which the
prosecutor had no evidence at all. This system would be even more
effective than ours in producing wrongful convictions. Ours,
however, is nearly perfect.
Officially, we profess adherence to the principle that guilt must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Our Supreme Court declares, “It
is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned.”13 In almost every case, however, plea
bargaining vaporizes the legal standard. Even the imagination of
Franz Kafka never conjured up a system as strange as ours. What
does the legal priesthood say to keep it afloat?
II. IS IT WRONG TO CONVICT THE INNOCENT?
Here is the basic defense of this system: Bargaining may result in
the conviction of “defendants who are in fact innocent (and would be
acquitted [at trial]),” but that does not mean it produces any
wrongful convictions. It is better to be an innocent person on
probation than an innocent person in prison. When an innocent
defendant has been offered a beneficial deal, he should be permitted
to take it. With friends who would block a wrongly accused
defendant from entering an agreement that would reduce his
expected sentence, he does not need enemies. Convicting the
innocent is not wrongful when the innocent want it to happen.14
Defenders of plea bargaining can note that, rather than increase
the aggregate amount of punishment inflicted on the innocent, odds
bargaining simply distributes it differently. If ten innocent
defendants were to stand trial, one might be wrongly convicted and
sentenced to ten years. With odds bargaining, all ten may be
convicted, but each may serve only one year. The number of
wrongful convictions will increase, but not the number of years of
wrongful imprisonment. Moreover, with costs bargaining added to
the picture, the total quantum of punishment inflicted on the
innocent may diminish.15 A champion of plea bargaining should not
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1123–24 (2008)
(“[P]ermitting innocent defendants to offer false on-the-record admission of guilt . . . is wholly
ethical if the system reconceives of false admissions as utilitarian legal fictions.”).
15 The total amount of punishment will fall, however, only if the sentences imposed
following conviction at trial are no more severe than those that would be imposed in the
absence of plea bargaining. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text (challenging this
13
14
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hesitate to acknowledge that bargaining “convict[s] defendants who
are in fact innocent (and would be acquitted [at trial]).” He should
cheer their conviction as a mark of the freedom our great nation
affords them.
The Supreme Court offered two cheers (but not three16) for the
autonomy of innocent defendants when it ruled in North Carolina v.
Alford17 that the Constitution does not preclude accepting a guilty
plea by a defendant who protests his innocence. Alford was a
capital case. The defendant told the court, “I ain’t shot no man, but
I take the fault for the other man. We never had an argument in
our life and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn’t they
would gas me for it . . . .”18 You might be surprised to learn that the
Due Process Clause does not preclude imprisoning people who have
neither been tried nor admitted their guilt, but the Supreme Court
explained, “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a
prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime.”19
The libertarian or “freedom of contract” defense of plea
bargaining confronts some serious difficulties. An agreement
produced by an improper threat (“your money or your life”) is
involuntary,20 and a threat to impose “extra” punishment for
standing trial is surely wrongful. The Constitution affords a right
to trial, which means at a minimum that the government may not
make standing trial a crime.21 If post-trial sentences are imposed

assumption).
16 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
17 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
18 Id. at 28 n.2.
19 Id. at 37. John Blume and Rebecca Helm describe a case in which three defendants
entered negotiated Alford pleas to “a murder they adamantly maintained they did not
commit, which the overwhelming weight of the evidence suggested they did not commit, and
which almost no one in the community where the crime occurred believed they committed.”
One of the three explained that he entered the agreement only because it led to the
immediate release from custody of a co-defendant on death row, a defendant who would have
remained under a death sentence unless all three of the defendants accepted the prosecutor’s
proposal. John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent
Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 160 (2014); see id. at 176–79
(describing two other, similarly disturbing cases).
20 ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 126 (1987).
See Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and
Confession, 74 DENVER U.L. REV. 957, 966 (1997); Scott Anderson, Coercion, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
coercion/#ThrBas.; Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats v. Uncontrived Warnings: A General
Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 503, 512–13 (2016).
21 See United States v. Medina-Cervantes, 690 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United
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simply for the purpose of inducing guilty pleas, the libertarian
defense collapses.
Some of the people who champion plea
bargaining by the innocent acknowledge that, in a “defensible” plea
bargaining system, “those cases that go to trial must be decided on
the merits, without penalizing the defendant for not pleading guilty.
In other words, trial sentences must be objectively deserved . . . .
Plea bargaining should therefore result in sentences less than this
theoretically correct sentence.”22
The American criminal justice system does not fit this benign
description. It is doubtful that any polity would deliberately
sentence 95 percent of all offenders to less than they deserve or to
less than is necessary to protect the public. Officials seem far more
likely to impose “extra” punishment on a small minority of offenders
to discourage exercise of the right to trial.23 Moreover, America
imprisons a higher proportion of its population than any other
nation in the world except the Republic of Seychelles.24 Surely our
States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d
1186, 1187 (9th Cir. 1973)). A defense of “plea bargaining as contract” by Robert Scott and
William Stuntz ignores this difficulty and responds to a straw-man version of what it calls
“the duress argument.” See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1920 (1992) (declaring that “[t]he duress argument against plea
bargaining is that the large differential between post-trial and post-plea sentences creates a
coercive environment in which the criminal defendant has no real alternative but to plead
guilty” and dismissing the argument because it “reduces to the claim that the choice to plead
guilty is too generous to defendants” and because “coercion in the sense of few and
unpalatable choices does not necessarily negate voluntary choice”).
22 Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 520
(1979); see Elhauge, supra note 20, at 570–71.
23 See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 700, 701. Although people disagree about the goals of
criminal punishment, almost everyone agrees that legitimate punishment must be limited by
a principle of parsimony. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68
(2005) (noting that parsimony requires the state to impose no more punishment than is
necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives of punishment); Michael Tonry, Intermediate
Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23 CRIME & JUST. 199, 206–07 (1998) (indicating that the
principle of parsimony is widely accepted). Depending on one’s penology, the principle of
parsimony may require that an offender be punished no more severely than he deserves, or no
more severely than necessary to ensure that the gains of crime will not exceed the costs, or no
more severely than necessary to accomplish some other penological goal. See Frase, supra, at
77. When the sentences imposed on defendants convicted at trial are limited by a principle of
parsimony, the lower sentences imposed on offenders who strike bargains and plead guilty
necessarily will fail to accomplish the purposes of the criminal law, whatever these purposes
may be. These punishments will fall short of what offenders deserve, or will leave crime a
profitable enterprise, or will fail to incapacitate dangerous offenders, or will leave salvageable
wrongdoers un-rehabilitated. It seems unlikely that officials would deliberately leave the
public inadequately protected and the great majority of offenders inadequately punished
when these officials could as easily discourage trials by punishing a small minority offenders
more severely than their crimes warranted.
24
See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (11th ed. 2015),
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison_population
_list_11th_edition.pdf (“The countries with the highest prison population rate—that is, the
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nation did not achieve its record for mass incarceration while
sentencing 95 percent of all offenders to less than they deserve.25 A
Chicago judge explained our trial tariff this way: “He takes some of
my time—I take some of his. That’s the way it works.”26
Even the legal priesthood seems to have abandoned the fiction
that today’s post-trial sentences are those that would be imposed in
the absence of plea bargaining. Quoting Professor Bibas, the
Supreme Court noted in Lafler v. Cooper,27 “The expected posttrial
sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the
sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would
view the full price as the norm and anything less a bargain.”28
Quoting Professor Barkow, the Court added in Missouri v. Frye,29
“[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer
sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might think
appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely
for bargaining purposes.”30
These observations decimate the
“voluntariness,” “personal autonomy,” “libertarian,” or “freedom of
contract” defense of plea bargaining.31
number of prisoners per 100,000 of the national population—are Seychelles (799 per 100,000),
followed by the United States (698), St. Kitts & Nevis (607), Turkmenistan (583), U.S. Virgin
Islands (542), Cuba (510), El Salvador (492), Guam – U.S.A. (469), Thailand (461), Belize
(449), Russian Federation (445), Rwanda (434) and British Virgin Islands (425).”).
25 How odd it is that the nation most dependent on plea bargaining is also the nation that
imprisons the highest proportion of its population apart from Seychelles. Could it be that, by
reducing the cost of imposing criminal punishment, plea bargaining has given us more of it?
Is it possible that, rather than reducing what taxpayers must pay for criminal justice, plea
bargaining has caused them to pay much more?
26 Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1089.
27 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
28 Id. at 1387 (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011)).
29 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
30 Id. at 1407 (alteration in original) (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and
the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)).
31 The Supreme Court, however, seemed oblivious to the implications of its empirical
observations. It wrote. “To note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it. The
potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their
crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can
benefit both parties.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. If post-trial sentences are unjust and are
imposed simply for the purpose of inducing guilty pleas, however, plea bargaining benefits
both parties only in the sense that a gunman’s demand for your money or your life benefits
you as well as the gunman. Compared to death at the hands of the gunman, “your money or
your life” is a very attractive offer.
Josh Bowers’ defense of plea bargaining by the innocent appears to acknowledge that
their pleas are often the result of “overcharging” and are involuntary, but he comments, “The
problem affects all defendants; it is not exclusive to the innocent.” Bowers, supra note 14, at
1123. Bowers maintains that it is “wrongheaded and even unjust to allow a factually guilty
defendant to make a rational choice in the face of . . . trial’s potential penalties . . . but to force
an innocent defendant . . . to risk, against her will, an uncertain trial with significant
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The “autonomy” defense might leave one cold even if post-trial
sentences were not inflated to generate guilty pleas. On this
generous (and far-fetched) hypothesis, guilty defendants would
receive sentences in exchange for their pleas that left them
inadequately punished and the public inadequately protected.32
The defenders of plea bargaining would land on the other horn of a
dilemma. Although the champions of plea bargaining maintain
that, in theory, avoiding the cost of trials could justify the
penological sacrifice, no analysis of real-world costs and benefits has
begun to make this claim plausible. Can the benefits society would
gain by imprisoning an offender for the five or ten additional years
his conduct warrants truly be offset by the cost of operating a
courtroom for a day or two?
In addition, “bargaining down” from a baseline of “deserved” or
“appropriate” sentences is objectionable for non-utilitarian reasons.
Would defenders of this practice allow defendants to offer cash in
exchange for leniency? Would they favor an auction in which
defendants could bid for undeserved leniency while their enemies
could bid for restoring their punishments to an appropriate level?33
Finally, some defendants may be innocent and may need no
punishment. A decent legal system should want to hear what they
can say in their defense. It should neither threaten nor bribe them
not to say it.
In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries,
courts wanted to hear what defendants could say in their defense.34
Although the distinction between threats to worsen a person’s
situation and promises to better his situation may separate
involuntary from voluntary choices in other contexts,35 courts did
not draw this distinction in evaluating confessions and guilty pleas.
downside.” Id. at 1159.
If that is Bowers’ only point, I concur. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1413–14. The
remedy for a gunman’s improper threat is not to inform his victims that they may not yield to
the threat and must suffer the consequences. But that proposition does not justify Bowers’
conclusions that “inaccurate guilty pleas are merely symptomatic of errors at the points of
arrest, charge, or trial” and that “many innocent defendants are better off in a world with
plea bargaining than one without it.” Bowers, supra note 14, at 1119. In an article that
followed his defense of allowing the innocent to plead guilty, Bowers suggested an approach
to limiting the threats that prosecutors and other officials may make in plea bargaining. See
Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083 (2016).
32 See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 702; supra note 23.
33 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652,
673–80 (1981).
34 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 5-6, 7–9,
19–24 (1979).
35 See the sources cited in note 20 supra.
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Instead they forbade both threats and promises.36 The Supreme
Court said that a confession must be “uninfluenced by hope of
reward or fear of punishment”37 and that it cannot be admitted “if
made under any threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or
favor.”38 It added that a court may not receive a confession unless it
is “free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight.”39
It was the danger of wrongful conviction that prompted these
declarations. The Supreme Court wrote in 1884:
[T]he presumption upon which weight is given to
[confessions], namely, that one who is innocent will not
imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue
statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been
made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal
nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge
preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person.40
A century earlier, in 1783, the Court of Kings Bench observed, “[A]
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit
ought to be given to it.”41
III. FEEBLE BRAKES
In words that Karl Marx employed in a different context, the
champions of plea bargaining seem to regard the entry of guilty
pleas by innocent defendants as an “Eden of the innate rights of
man [where] alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and
Bentham.”42 Perhaps because even these champions find it difficult
See Alschuler, supra note 20, at 967-69.
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884).
38 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (citing 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A
TREATISE ON THE EVIDENCE OF LAW §§ 214, 215, 219 (15th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and Co.
1892)).
39 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897) (quoting 3 WM. OLDNALL RUSSELL,
A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (6th ed., London, Stevens and Sons 1896)).
40 Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
41 R v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235; 1 Leach 263, 263–64; see also State v.
Bostick, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563, 564 (1845) (“[W]here promises of favor or threats are used, the
great danger is, that the confession, whether verbal or written, may be untrue; proceeding,
not from a sense of guilt, but from the influence of hope or fear. . . . However slight the
promise or threat may have been, the confession cannot be received.”).
42 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 176 (Frederick Engels ed.,
Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., International Publishers 7th prtg. 1975) (1867).
36
37
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to cheer conviction of the innocent, however, many of them contend
that it doesn’t happen often.
Not long ago, people simply denied that there were any innocent
defendants. They quoted Judge Learned Hand: “Our procedure has
been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It
is an unreal dream.”43 Since the first DNA exoneration in 1989,
however, more than 1900 prisoners have been exonerated by
pardon, dismissal, or acquittal,44 and their cases have made smug
pronouncements like Hand’s a thing of the past.
The defenders of plea bargaining now point to psychological
phenomena, legal safeguards, and professional practices that they
suggest may limit conviction of the innocent. The possible brakes
on wrongful conviction by guilty plea include (1) the reluctance of
wrongly accused defendants to plead guilty, (2) court rules requiring
judges to find a “factual basis” for a guilty plea, (3) the ethics of
prosecutors who say that they do not prosecute defendants unless
they are personally convinced of the defendants’ guilt, (4) the ethics
of defense attorneys who say that they do not permit guilty pleas
when clients maintain their innocence, and (5) the fact that realworld bargains can occur even when these bargains do not reduce a
defendant’s “expected” sentence.
A. Defendants
Both direct observations of the criminal justice system and
laboratory experiments by psychologists support two propositions:
(1) Plea bargaining induces many innocent defendants to convict
themselves; and (2) plea bargaining does not induce innocent
defendants to convict themselves at the same rate as guilty
defendants. When innocent and guilty defendants in similar
circumstances receive identical offers, the guilty are more likely to
accept them.45
Scholars have offered three possible explanations for the fact that
innocent defendants sometimes turn down offers that guilty

United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
See The National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
45 See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2328 &
n.106 (2006) (citing authorities). Although the empirical evidence uniformly supports the
propositions in text, Scott and Stuntz suggest that innocent defendants are more likely than
guilty defendants to accept offers that fail to reduce their expected punishment because the
innocent defendants are likely to be more risk averse. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 21, at
1943.
43
44
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defendants would accept: (1) Innocent defendants are overly
optimistic. More than guilty defendants, they tend to overestimate
their chances of acquittal at trial.46 (2) Innocent defendants have
valuable information that prosecutors lack—namely, that they are
innocent.47
This information enables them to evaluate the
likelihood of success at trial better than the prosecutors.48 (3) Just
as the participants in ultimatum games may not seek to maximize
their personal wealth,49 innocent defendants may not seek to
minimize their expected sentences. They may decline apparently
beneficial offers simply because they view these offers (or the
bargaining process itself) as unfair.50
The academic literature has largely neglected a fourth possible
explanation—one that once loomed large in discussions of plea
bargaining. This explanation focuses on the other half of the
comparison between innocent and guilty defendants: (4) Some guilty
pleas by guilty defendants are prompted in whole or in part by their

46 See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54–55 (2012)
(declaring that criminal defendants tend to be overly optimistic and that first offenders and
innocent defendants tend to be particularly so); Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of
Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 224 (2005)
(suggesting that innocence places suspects at risk because they naively believe that their
innocence will be apparent to others and that the truth will set them free); Avishalom Tor et
al., Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
97, 98 (2010) (“Experimental evidence . . . suggests that innocents are systematically more
optimistically biased about acquittal odds than their guilty counterparts.”) (citing Kenneth S.
Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Punishment, and Assumed Role
on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 69, 70 (1984)); W.
Larry Gregory et al., Social Psychology and Plea Bargaining: Applications, Methodology, and
Theory, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1521, 1525 (1978)).
47 See Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 749 (1983); Gregory et al., supra note 46, at 1525; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 21,
at 1937.
48 This explanation is obviously in tension with the first: Does innocence make defendants
better or worse at predicting trial outcomes? But either explanation might be accurate in a
particular case. Sometimes innocent defendants may decline prosecutorial offers because
these defendants are too optimistic, and sometimes they may decline offers because they
understand better than the prosecutors the likelihood of acquittal at trial. In other words:
When innocent defendants estimate their chances of acquittal more highly than the
prosecutors do, sometimes they’re right, and sometimes they’re wrong.
49 See J. Neil Bearden, Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: The State of the Art 3, 43
(Dec. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=626183.
50 See Tor et al., supra note 46, at 98. See also Samuel R. Gross, Exonerating the Innocent:
Pretrial Innocence Procedures: Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting
Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (2012)
(“[Defendants’] private knowledge that they are innocent may legitimately affect their
assessment of the likely outcome at trial; they may be unduly optimistic out of a misplaced
faith that the truth will out; and they may maintain their innocence against all odds as a
matter of principle.”).
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remorse or their willingness to accept responsibility for their crimes.
Innocent defendants lack this motivation. Of course none of the
four possible explanations fits every case. Indeed, the favorite
explanation of economists—that defendants’ knowledge of whether
they are guilty or innocent enables them to predict trial outcomes
better than prosecutors—probably fits very few.51
Although more than 90 percent of all felony convictions follow
guilty pleas, only 333 of the 1916 convicts exonerated between 1989
and November 2016 had pleaded guilty (17%).52 The disparity

51 A jury bases its verdict, not on what a defendant knows or believes, but on the evidence
before it. It is only when a defendant’s knowledge of his innocence enables him to better
estimate either the availability or the force of some evidence that this knowledge may aid him
in deciding how to plead. In some cases, knowledge of innocence that a defendant cannot
effectively convey to the prosecutor may lead him wisely to reject an offer. Gene Grossman
and Michael Katz, however, leap from this observation to the conclusion that “the optimal
plea bargain acts as a screening device, such that only those who are actually guilty so plead,
while the innocent choose instead to engage in trial.” Grossman & Katz, supra note 47, at
750. The authors qualify their conclusion only by noting its inapplicability when the parties
have different attitudes toward risk. See id. They ignore the fact that, even when the
innocent have a slight advantage in assessing one element of the bargaining calculus, they
may differ from prosecutors in assessing other elements. They also ignore the fact that
innocent defendants may be unduly optimistic. And they ignore the fact that an “optimal”
plea agreement is one calculated to overbalance the defendant’s chances of acquittal. See
Grossman & Katz, supra note 47, at 750, 756. An agreement remains advantageous from the
prosecutor’s perspective as long as both the costs it saves and the certainty of conviction it
buys exceed the economic value of the punishment it sacrifices.
Grossman and Katz write, “The legal system is fundamentally characterized by
asymmetric information; the accused know whether they are guilty, while the prosecutor
never can be certain . . . .” Grossman & Katz, supra note 47, at 749–50. This asymmetry is
the only one they note, but there are many others. Prosecutors probably have the overall edge
in estimating trial outcomes. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 696 n.88. For one thing,
professional estimates are likely to be superior to amateur estimates, and, unlike defense
attorneys, prosecutors need not take account of the wishes of amateur clients. For another,
prosecutors typically know more than defendants and their lawyers about the most important
determinant of trial outcomes, the strength or weakness of the state’s evidence.
Grossman and Katz deny that this second asymmetry exists. They write, “The Supreme
Court has ruled in U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) that the defendant must be fully informed of all evidence available to the state, and of
the facts needed by the state to establish the case against him, prior to the arraignment and
choice of a plea.” Grossman & Katz, supra note 47, at 752 n.11. The authors, however,
grossly misstate these decisions. Brady and Agurs do not require prosecutors to inform
defendants of “all evidence available to the state.” They require the disclosure only of
exculpatory evidence. Moreover, these decisions do not require even the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence prior to the negotiation and entry of a plea of guilty. See United States
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that the due process clause does not require
“preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment information” while leaving open the question
whether the clause may require the disclosure of other Brady material); Russell D. Covey,
Plea Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 601 (2013) (“It is . . . unclear
whether a prosecutor has a constitutional duty to produce exculpatory evidence . . . before a
guilty plea is entered.”).
52 See The National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., http://
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-
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between the percentage of all convicts convicted by guilty plea and
the percentage of exonerated convicts convicted by plea probably
reflects in part the reluctance of innocent defendants to accept
offers that guilty defendants would accept. But it also reflects the
fact that innocent defendants who plead guilty are very unlikely to
be exonerated.
The legal barriers to exoneration following a guilty plea are high.
Even when a wrongly convicted defendant can establish that his
guilty plea resulted from a coerced confession, the courts will refuse
to listen.53 In addition, some states bar a convict who has pleaded
guilty from obtaining and presenting DNA evidence.54 As one
federal court explained, “A guilty plea is normally understood as a
lid on the box, whatever is in it . . . .”55
The practical barriers to exoneration are high as well. In the
absence of a trial record, it is extraordinarily difficult to know what
evidence a prosecutor might have presented to a court or jury.56
Moreover, exoneration usually requires the assistance of an
innocence project, a journalist, or a volunteer lawyer,57 and in
deciding which professedly innocent convicts to help, these
gatekeepers may concentrate on those who have consistently denied
their guilt.58 The scrutiny of gatekeepers and of courts and
governors’ offices focuses particularly on death row inmates, none of
whom have pleaded guilty,59 and on inmates serving long sentences,
5A68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterField1=Group&FilterValue1=P (last visited Nov.
12, 2016).
53 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
54 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72(C)(2) (West 2016) (“An offender is not an
eligible offender . . . regarding any offense to which the offender pleaded guilty or no
contest.”); People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007); Williams v. Erie Cnty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, 848 A.2d 967, 968, 973 (Pa. Super Ct. 2004); People v. Byrdsong, 820
N.Y.S.2d 296, 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). For an argument that DNA testing should not be
available to defendants who have pleaded guilty, see JH Dingfelder Stone, Facing the
Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Post-Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who
Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 47 (2010).
55 United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir. 1975).
56 When, for example, the only witness ever to implicate an innocent convict has recanted,
it may be impossible to establish that the prosecutor lacked other evidence. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Mo. 2003) (Wolff, J., concurring). And even when
an innocent convict can show that the prosecutor had no other evidence, the prosecutor may
note that he had no reason to seek further evidence once the convict agreed to plead guilty.
See Stone, supra note 54, at 56.
57 See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xv (2015).
58 David Protess, whose journalism seminar at Northwestern University helped exonerate
many wrongly convicted inmates, once told me that, in order to focus on the most promising
requests for assistance, he automatically rejected requests from convicts who had confessed or
pleaded guilty.
59 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
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relatively few of whom have pleaded guilty.60
Psychological experiments seem likely to overstate the extent to
which guilty and innocent defendants differ in their willingness to
enter plea agreements. Researchers typically present a hypothetical
criminal or academic disciplinary case to a group of students and
instruct the students to imagine that they are either guilty or
innocent of the offense described. Then the experimenters ask
whether the students would accept a hypothetical offer—one that
usually does not seem either clearly advantageous or clearly
disadvantageous.61 Well-bred students are likely to consider it
virtuous to accept responsibility when one has done something
wrong and virtuous to resist when one has been falsely accused.
These students may view their hypothetical guilt or innocence as at
least a tiebreaker when they are uncertain whether a hypothetical
offer will reduce their expected sentence. Their responses may not
reveal much about the choices made by wrongly accused defendants
whose social backgrounds differ from theirs, who receive offers
clearly calculated to overbalance their chances of acquittal, who are
advised by lawyers with strong personal interests in persuading
them to plead guilty,62 and who may pay with real years of
imprisonment for making seemingly virtuous choices.
The most revealing of the psychological studies may be one
conducted by Lucian Dervan and Vanessa Edkins.63 Rather than
simply pose a hypothetical case, these researchers gave students an
opportunity to cheat on an academic exercise by giving improper

671, 671–72 (2009).
60 Defendants serving long sentences are more likely to be exonerated than other
defendants for several reasons: (1) Long sentences aggravate the injustice of wrongful
convictions and help to attract attention and assistance. (2) Long sentences are likely to be
imposed in prominent cases that attract attention and assistance for other reasons. (3) Long
sentences enable convicts to make repeated pleas for help. And (4) long sentences allow the
lengthy process of exoneration to occur. The website of Innocence Project New Orleans
declares that it accepts applications only from people “serving a life sentence or a near life
sentence with at least 10 years left to be served.” How We Take Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT
NEW ORLEANS, http://www.ip-no.org/how-we-take-cases (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). Many
other projects accept applications only from convicts with three, five, seven, eight, or ten
years still to serve. See Innocence Projects Contact List, TRUTH IN JUSTICE http://www.truthin
justice.org/ipcontacts.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
61 See, e.g., Bordens, supra note 46, at 63; Gregory et al., supra note 46, at 1522, 1526; Tor
et al., supra note 46, at 104. One of the studies cited above indicated that, when an offer
becomes clearly advantageous, the willingness of “innocent” role-playing students to accept it
notably increases. See Bordens, supra note 46, at 67.
62 See infra Part III.E.
63 See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013).
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help to another student who asked for it. The researchers then
compared the behavior of the students who had cheated with that of
students who performed the same exercise without being asked to
cheat. When accused of misconduct and offered a favorable bargain,
33 of the 37 cheaters (89%) accepted the bargain and acknowledged
their guilt—and so did 22 of the 39 falsely accused students (56%).64
Offers apparently can be made so advantageous that a majority of
innocent defendants will accept them.65
When plea bargaining does only what its champions say it should
do, prosecutors make it expedient for almost every defendant to
plead guilty whether he is guilty or innocent. The claim that
egocentric and other cognitive biases will keep many innocent
defendants from doing what prosecutors have made it advantageous
for them to do isn’t very comforting. Although some wrongly
accused defendants may not seek rationally to minimize their
expected sentences, many others may behave like the homines
economici of economic studies.66
B. Courts
When the Supreme Court held in Alford that a court may accept a
guilty plea from a defendant who claims to be innocent, it noted
that strong evidence contradicted the defendant’s claim, and it said,
“[V]arious state and federal court decisions properly caution that
pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted

Id. at 34 fig.1.
In an earlier study comparing the behavior of cheaters on an academic exercise with the
behavior of students falsely accused of cheating, six of eight students who had cheated
accepted a proposed bargain, while none of eight wrongly accused students accepted it. See
Gregory et al., supra note 46, at 1526 (describing the second of the authors’ two experiments).
Not only was the number of subjects in Gregory’s study small, but the proposed bargain was
less favorable to the subjects than the bargain proposed in the Dervan study. Moreover, it
seemed likely that Gregory’s innocent subjects turned down the proposed bargain because
they saw little or no likelihood of conviction at the threatened disciplinary hearing. The only
evidence of cheating the accuser proposed to present was that the subjects had done
exceptionally well on the test. Id. at 1527.
The accuser told the cheaters as well as the wrongly accused students that he would be
the only witness at their hearings, and he threatened them with the same feeble evidence.
Id. Unlike the innocent students, however, the cheaters knew that other witnesses with more
damaging testimony existed—the people who had given them advance information concerning
the test. See id. at 1526. They might have feared that the accuser would not in fact be the
only witness.
66 Cf. Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (2002) (noting
that, although the parties to civil disputes sometimes bargain to maximize their personal
wealth, personal enmity often keeps them from bargaining).
64
65
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unless there is a factual basis for the plea.”67 Whether or not a
defendant acknowledges his guilt, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires a court to “determine that there is a
factual basis for the plea.”68 Many states have similar rules.69
As this Article has noted, a prosecutor may be unable to make an
offer that will overbalance a defendant’s chances of acquittal when
the prosecutor has no evidence whatever of the defendant’s guilt,70
and when a prosecutor has some evidence of guilt, a court can easily
find that this evidence constitutes a “factual basis.”71 A defendant’s
one-word answer to the question whether he engaged in the conduct
described in the indictment establishes a sufficient basis,72 and
“inquiry of the prosecutor, or defense counsel, examination of the
plea agreement, presentence report or preliminary hearing
transcript, [or] testimony by the police” suffices as well.73 Courts
occasionally hold that a guilty plea lacked a factual basis because
the conduct a defendant admitted did not establish the crime to
which he pleaded guilty,74 but the “factual basis” requirement rarely
poses a significant barrier to the conviction of an innocent
defendant who has been induced by a favorable offer to plead
guilty.75
C. Prosecutors
Many prosecutors say they must be firmly convinced of a
defendant’s guilt before they prosecute.76 Others say that judging
guilt or innocence is not their job.77 Even prosecutors who declare

67 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10, 39 (1970) (citing Griffin v. United States,
405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.D.C. 1968); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 1967);
Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 249 A.2d 294, 294 (Pa. 1969)).
68 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
69 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1049 (5th ed. 2009).
70 See supra text accompanying note 8.
71 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, at 1049 (“[The rules fail to] establish a precise
quantum of evidence that must be met”); Allison D. Redlich & Asil Ali Özdo ru, Alford Pleas
in the Age of Innocence, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 467, 470 (2009) (noting that, although a judge
must determine that sufficient evidence supports an Alford plea, “sufficient” has been left
undefined).
72 See, e.g., People v. Holmes, 84 P.3d 366, 369 (Cal. 2004).
73 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, at 1049.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Paulin, 627 F.3d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 2010).
75 See Redlich & Özdo ru, supra note 71, at 470 (noting that confessions, eyewitness
identifications, and other seemingly powerful evidence have supported the convictions of most
subsequently exonerated convicts).
76 See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 63 & n.40; Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 83–86 (2010).
77 See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 63 (“[M]y job is to prosecute, not persecute; equally,
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that they must be personally convinced of a defendant’s guilt
sometimes qualify their position—for example, by saying that they
make no judgment about whether the defendant acted in selfdefense or had the mental state required for conviction.78
One individual’s opinion is a weak safeguard against conviction of
the innocent, especially when this individual is a prosecutor and
especially when he has engaged in odds bargaining because he
knows that a jury may disagree.79
Laurie Levenson has
encountered prosecutors who maintained that every defendant who
invokes his Miranda rights must be guilty.80 Daniel Medwed
observes that many prosecutors have vigorously resisted
exoneration even when prisoners have presented overwhelming
proof of their innocence.81 As a general rule, one should not trust a
prosecutor who says, “Trust me.”82
D. Defense Attorneys
As best I can tell, no recent study examines what advice defense
attorneys give clients who claim to be innocent but who could
reduce their expected punishment by pleading guilty. When I
examined this question in the late 1960s and again shortly after the
Alford decision in 1973, however, some attorneys reported that they
would not permit clients who said they were innocent to plead
guilty.83 Some of these attorneys qualified this position in various
ways;84 some made exceptions;85 and some evidently did not mean
what they said.86 Many of these lawyers rested their refusal to
allow assertedly innocent clients to plead guilty, not on ethical
however, my job is to prosecute, not judge.”).
78 See id. at 64 n.42; Burke, supra note 76, at 86–91.
79 See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 64.
80 See Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem with Cynical Prosecutors’ Syndrome: Rethinking a
Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 340 (2016).
81 Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004).
82 See Alex Kozinski, Foreword, in SIDNEY POWELL, LICENSED TO LIE: EXPOSING
CORRUPTION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, at XII–XIII, XV, XVI–XVII (2014).
83 Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1299.
84 See id. at 1281 (“Many lawyers said that although they would not countenance a guilty
plea when a client maintained that he was entirely uninvolved in an alleged criminal
incident, they did not apply the same principle when the client asserted a claim of selfdefense, entrapment, lack of criminal intent, or the like.”).
85 See id. at 1280–81 (describing exceptions that lawyers made when prosecutorial offers
were unusually favorable or when clients were charged with certain crimes).
86 See id. at 1285 (describing a lawyer who told me that he did not permit assertedly
innocent clients to plead guilty although I had seen him mention and disparage his clients’
claims of innocence while bargaining with a prosecutor).
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grounds, but on their apprehension that the clients ultimately
might challenge their guilty pleas and allege the lawyers’
ineffectiveness.87
Other lawyers in the late 1960s and early 1970s took the view
that “the truth has nothing to do with a guilty plea.”88 Some of
these lawyers had advised clients to plead guilty even when they
had no doubt that their clients’ protestations of innocence were
true.89 Although judges routinely asked defendants whether they
were pleading guilty because they were guilty and for no other
reason, some lawyers maintained that clients had “a right to lie for
probation—at least so long as the courts surround the acceptance of
a guilty plea with such outrageous bullshit.”90
I suspect that few lawyers today refuse to allow assertedly
innocent clients to plead guilty.91 Although states need not allow
Alford pleas (pleas of “guilty but not guilty”92), forty-seven states
and the District of Columbia do allow them,93 and it would be
unconscionable for a lawyer to block his client from exercising a
beneficial option the courts have made available. Individual judges,
however, still refuse to accept Alford pleas,94 and when they do,
defense attorneys confront challenging ethical issues.95
The attorneys who formerly did not permit clients to plead guilty
if the clients said they were innocent rarely advised these clients to
stand trial.96 Instead, after obtaining apparently beneficial offers
and describing the advantage of pleading guilty to their clients, the
attorneys told these clients that the attorneys would not allow them
to plead unless they admitted their guilt.97 Many clients then said
what the attorneys apparently needed to hear in order to represent
them effectively.98 Moreover, when the proposed bargains failed to
produce confessions, some attorneys went “almost to the point of
coercion” in obtaining them.99 When clients nevertheless refused to
See id. at 1283–84.
See id. at 1287.
89 See id. at 1296.
90 Id. at 1306.
91 See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1379
(2003) (“Every defense lawyer whom I interviewed approved of [Alford] pleas.”).
92 See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
93 Bibas, supra note 91, at 1372 n.52.
94 Id. at 1379.
95 See Joel Cohen, ‘Counseling’ an Innocent’s Guilty Plea, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 2010, at 1.
96 See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1286.
97 See id. at 1286–87.
98 See id. at 1286.
99 See, e.g., id. at 1287.
87
88
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admit their guilt, the attorneys commonly advised them, not that
the attorneys would take their cases to trial, but that the clients
should find new lawyers.100 Most public defender offices, for
example, refused to enter guilty pleas on behalf of clients who
claimed to be innocent, but when these clients persisted in
protesting their innocence, the offices sought permission to
withdraw from their cases so that the court could appoint counsel
from outside the public defender office.101 The refusal of some
lawyers to enter guilty pleas on behalf of clients who claimed to be
innocent rarely led to trials at which these clients might have been
acquitted.
E. Departures from the Economic Model
In the economic model described above, offers become acceptable
to both parties only when they overbalance the defendants’ chances
of acquittal. Although many real-world plea agreements fit this
model, many do not.102
Lawyers sometimes toss the economic vision of plea bargaining to
the winds. A prosecutor explained:
When I sit down with a defense attorney who knows how to
be reasonable, we judge the whole man. Neither of us cares
what evidence would be admissible and what would not, or
which one of us would win at trial. We simply try to do the
fair thing with each case.103
Josh Bowers maintains that prosecutors in misdemeanor cases
have little interest in maximizing the punishment of offenders.104
These prosecutors “provide bargain concessions that far exceed
what is necessary to motivate pleas. Prosecutors make such lenient
offers because they can. They enjoy little public or official scrutiny
in low-stakes cases.”105 Although bargaining in accordance with the
economic model makes it advantageous for almost every defendant
to plead guilty whether he is guilty or innocent, the pressures on

See id. at 1306–07.
See id. at 1284 (“We have no ‘rule’ against permitting defendants to plead guilty when
they claim to be innocent. Our only ‘rule’ is that they may not do so when they are
represented by our office.”).
102 I confess to being surprised that the responses reported by Bushway, Redlich, and
Norris matched the economic model as closely as they did. See Bushway et al., supra note 11,
at 740 tbl.3; supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
103 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 54.
104 See Bowers, supra note 14, at 1122–23.
105 Id. at 1122.
100
101
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innocent defendants to plead guilty in misdemeanor courts may be
even greater than those envisioned by this model.106
In felony cases, the story is likely to be the reverse: Many
defendants may accept offers that do not overbalance their chances
of acquittal. The actors most responsible for scrapping the economic
model may be defense attorneys, not prosecutors. Prosecutors need
not make offers that will overbalance the defendants’ chances of
acquittal when their lawyers do not insist on such offers and back
their demands with creditable threats of trial.107 And defense
attorneys may not demand offers overbalancing their clients’
chances of acquittal because the lawyers’ personal interests strongly
favor the entry of pleas of guilty.
For many private defense attorneys, a guilty plea is a quick buck.
These attorneys collect their fees in advance, and once they have
obtained their fees, their interests lie in disposing of their cases
rapidly. This financial conflict of interest influences even well paid,
conscientious lawyers, and the bar includes some lawyers who are
not well paid and conscientious. These lawyers handle a high
volume of cases for small fees and rarely take a case to trial.108
Plea negotiation also minimizes work and reduces conflict within
what organizational theorists call the “courtroom workgroup.”109
Bargaining promotes cordial and comfortable relationships with
prosecutors and judges. These interests may influence public
defenders even more than they do private lawyers.
Advising a client to enter a plea agreement can never be proven
wrong. Taking a case to trial can look like a mistake, especially
when this decision results in a sentence far more severe than the
one the prosecutor offered before trial. When a lawyer has
persuaded his client to plead guilty, however, he can always
imagine that things would have been worse if the client had been
106 In Malcolm Feeley’s study of the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven, not one
defendant in a sample of 1640 cases exercised the right to trial. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY,
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 8, 9, 10
(1979). I have suggested, however, that most plea bargaining in misdemeanor courts is
overkill and that the “process costs” of misdemeanor justice would lead nearly all defendants
to plead guilty even if their exercise of the right to trial did not lead to harsher punishment.
See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 955.
107 The distinction I make here between felony and misdemeanor cases is rough. Lawyers’
personal interests may lead them to approve offers that do not truly overbalance their clients’
chances of conviction in misdemeanor as well as felony cases, and busy or lazy prosecutors
may offer greater concessions than the economic model says they should in felony as well as
misdemeanor cases.
108 See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1181–1206.
109
See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 294 (1991).

2015/2016]

A Nearly Perfect System

939

tried. Advising a guilty plea is nearly always the safe, secure,
comfortable, and profitable course. Everything in our criminal
justice system pushes lawyers in that direction. Without explaining
the economic model to their clients or even pausing to consider it
themselves, they may persuade both their clients and themselves
that a guilty plea is a good deal.
When offers do not overbalance a defendant’s chances of acquittal,
the pressure on him to plead guilty may not lessen, for the greatest
pressure to plead guilty may come from his attorney rather than the
prosecutor. In their efforts to persuade clients to plead guilty,
defense attorneys sometimes browbeat them,110 emphasize or
exaggerate the strength of the prosecutor’s evidence,111 emphasize
or exaggerate the sentences likely to follow conviction at trial,112
enlist family members to urge the clients to see reality,113 threaten
to withdraw from the clients’ cases,114 and lie.115
All in all, the American legal system is brilliant. This system
makes it in the interest of defense attorneys as well as prosecutors
and judges to convince defendants to plead guilty. As I told you, this
system is nearly perfectly designed to convict the innocent.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of plea
bargaining in 1970, it wrote:
We would have serious doubts about this case if the
encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency
substantially increased the likelihood that defendants,
advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn
110 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1288 (describing a lawyer who persuaded a client
to plead guilty by calling her “a lousy, lying bitch,” telling her “she would go to the gas
chamber,” threating to withdraw from her case, and advising her that the police had found
evidence they had not found).
111 See, e.g., id. at 1309 (“What about this fact? Is it going to go away? How the hell would
you vote if you were a juror in your case?”).
112 See, e.g., id. at 1195 (“[I]f you are convicted at trial, [that judge] is going to lose you.”).
113 See, e.g., id. at 1193 (quoting United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457, 459
(2d Cir. 1970)) (“I brought out the fact that it would be awfully hard on the family to come
here and have to claim a body that had been electrocuted, for a mother to have to do
something like that.”); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the
Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 57 (1976) (quoting Brief for Petitioner, Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (No. 270), 1969 WL 119963, at *45) (“So then Brady came to the
[jail] window. It was upstairs. I don’t know how many floors. Brady came to the window and
he said, ‘Mom what are you doing? You are going to get yourself in trouble,’ and I just said,
‘For God’s sake, plead guilty. They are going to give you the death sentence.’”).
114 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1192, 1247.
115 See, e.g., id. at 1195.
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themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on
our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that
pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by
competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and
that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability
of the defendants’ admissions that they committed the
crimes with which they are charged.116
As this Article has shown, bargaining almost certainly multiplies
the number of wrongful convictions. The view of plea bargaining
the Supreme Court took in 1970 rested on wishful thinking, but I do
not imagine the Court will change its mind.

116

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).

